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Introduction: Acute surgical patients are particularly vulnerable to human error. The Acute Physiological
Support Team (APST) was created with the twin objectives of identifying high-risk acute surgical patients
in the general wards and reducing both the incidence of error and impact of error on these patients. A
number of error taxonomies were used to understand the causes of human error and a simple risk
stratiﬁcation system was adopted to identify patients who are particularly at risk of error.
Results: During the period November 2012eJanuary 2013 a total of 101 surgical patients were cared for
by the APST at Edendale Hospital. The average age was forty years. There were 36 females and 65 males.
There were 66 general surgical patients and 35 trauma patients. Fifty-six patients were referred on the
day of their admission. The average length of stay in the APST was four days. Eleven patients were
haemo-dynamically unstable on presentation and twelve were clinically septic. The reasons for referral
were sepsis,4 respiratory distress,3 acute kidney injury AKI (38), post-operative monitoring (39),
pancreatitis,3 ICU down-referral,7 hypoxia,5 low GCS,1 coagulopathy.1 The mortality rate was 13%. A total
of thirty-six patients experienced 56 errors. A total of 143 interventions were initiated by the APST. These
included institution or adjustment of intravenous ﬂuids (101), blood transfusion,12 antibiotics,9 the
management of neutropenic sepsis,1 central line insertion,3 optimization of oxygen therapy,7 correction
of electrolyte abnormality,8 correction of coagulopathy.2
Conclusion: Our intervention combined current taxonomies of error with a simple risk stratiﬁcation
system and is a variant of the defence in depth strategy of error reduction. We effectively identiﬁed and
corrected a signiﬁcant number of human errors in high-risk acute surgical patients. This audit has helped
understand the common sources of error in the general surgical wards and will inform on-going error
reduction initiatives.
 2013 Surgical Associates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Article focus
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 Developing a team to manage the acute physiological
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH1. Introduction
High-risk operations such as cardiac procedures, solid organ
transplantation and major oncological resections are centralized in
well resourced centers with highly developed systems of care and
are generally performed with acceptable morbidity rates and very
lowmortality rates.1,2 High-risk non-cardiac general and acute care
surgery on the other hand is undertaken in a diverse number of
hospitals with variable levels of expertise and resources.2e8 In the
United Kingdom approximately 170,000 patients undergo high-
risk, non-cardiac surgery each year and sixty per cent experience
signiﬁcant morbidity and ﬁfteen percent die.2 There is also an
increased awareness that human error contributes signiﬁcantly to
these high levels of surgical morbidity and mortality and there is
considerable interest in strategies that try and reduce the incidence
and limit the impact of human error on health care.2e8 Several
modern taxonomies of error have been developed to assist with the
understanding of the cause of these errors.3,9,10 Any interventions
intended to reduce human error associated morbidity and mor-
tality amongst acute surgical patients, must accurately quantify
surgical risk and ensure that the level of risk is commensurate with
the appropriateness of the staff caring for the patient and the re-
sources available. To facilitate this the Royal College of Surgeons has
deﬁned four levels of care for surgical patients depending on the
assessed risk and these are summarized in Table 1.2
Edendale Hospital is a regional hospital in the South African city
of Pietermaritzburg in the Province of Kwa-Zulu Natal. It drains
patients from the peri-urban settlements around the city and from
the four deep rural hospitals of Sisonke district. There are ten
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds ﬁve high dependency (HDU) beds in
the Pietermaritzburg complex. These units generally run at a
hundred percent occupancy and have extremely high patient
turnover. For example in 2012 a total of 333 trauma patients were
admitted to ICU/HDU in Pietermaritzburg. This is in addition to a
signiﬁcant volume of patients with obstetrical and medical emer-
gencies who also require ICU/HDU care. Surgical patients who are
not admitted to the ICU or HDU for whatever reason remain under
the care of the surgery department. We have run quality
improvement programs at Edendale Hospital for the last ﬁve years.
These programs arose out of a number of audits of the quality of
care at our institution, which identiﬁed a number of deﬁcits.11,12
These deﬁcits included sub-optimal documentation and poor
communication leading to preventable errors and morbidity and
even mortality.11,12 In one of these audits a random sample of
twenty-ﬁve referral letters for patients with Traumatic Brain Injury
(TBI) was selected for review. The history was recorded in all the
referral letters reviewed, the GCS in 88%, a management plan in
75%, associated localizing signs in 50%, and the condition of the
pupils in 13%. In none of the referrals was an assessment of the
integrity of the cervical spine recorded. A random sample of 28
inpatient records of patients with TBI was also selected for review.
In 57% of cases the reason for admission was not recorded, in 42% a
skull radiograph was omitted despite being indicated, and in 15% a
computed tomography (CT) scan was omitted despite the caseTable 1
Classiﬁcationof levels of care according to the Royal College of Surgeons of England. (2).
Proposed levels of
care (2)
0 Ward Basic observations
1: Enhanced ward At risk of deterioration, more frequent observations,
basic resuscitation
2: High dependency Needs detailed observation, intervention or single
organ support
3: Intensive care Multiple organ support requiring complex interventionsmeeting our criteria for this investigation. In themanagement plans
of this group there were no recorded orders for supplemental ox-
ygen and intravenous (IV) ﬂuids. Clear instructions to perform
neurological observations were omitted in all cases. In the obser-
vation charts of this group the GCS was recorded in 92%, the state of
the pupils was recorded in 71%, pulse rate and blood pressure were
documented in 70%, oxygen saturation was only recorded in 42%,
and neither blood glucose readings nor core body temperature
were ever recorded.11 Another audit from our institution revealed
that the routine monitoring of acute trauma patients was incon-
sistent and incomplete and varied dramatically across geographical
locations within the same hospital.12
In response to these audits an Acute Physiological Support Team
(APST) was established with the twin objectives of identifying high-
risk acute surgical patients who were not admitted to ICU/HDU and
reducing the incidence and limiting the impact of human error on
these patients. The concept of the APST was based on Reasons
“Swiss Cheese” model of human error.9 In this model error is the
arrow that has to penetrate multiple layers of defence to strike the
patient. However each layer of defence is full of holes, like a piece of
Swiss Cheese. If all the holes align then the error can travel in a
straight line and hit the patient. Strengthening themultiple layers of
defence is known as defence in depth strategy. The APSTconsisted of
a medical ofﬁcer and an intern under the supervision of a single
dedicated senior specialist surgeon. Although therewas close liaison
with the nursing staff, we were unable to keep a dedicated nursing
team and during the period of the study therewas considerable turn
over of nursing staff. The parent surgical team would formally
request that the APST care for the patient. In effect this meant that
all patients were seen several times a day by different teams. These
included the parent team, the ICU/HDU team and the APST. Each
team can be considered as a layer of defence between the error and
the patient. The APST had ﬁfteen male beds and ten female beds.
Each bedwas equipped with non-invasive monitoring equipment as
well as oxygen points and infusion pumps. We were not able to
provide advanced respiratory support such as CPAP, or inotropic
support. The APST developed a monthly structured morbidity and
mortality meeting as a feedback or closed loop system. Each month
the statistics for the team were presented at the morbidity and
mortality meeting. The meeting commenced with an overview of
the role of the APST and then a brief discussion onmodern concepts
of error theory. Two index cases of error were selected out and
discussed in detail using a published taxonomy of error.
2. Methodology
All patients who were classiﬁed as level II or higher according to the Royal
College of Surgeons levels of care and were not admitted to ICU or HDU for whatever
reason were referred to the APST. A prospective data-base was established to
document each patient referred to the APST. Routine demographic data was recor-
ded as well as data concerning the clinical course. The APST collated all errors
detected by the team and the number of interventions to address these errors
initiated by the APST. Error was classiﬁed according to type or the process that failed,
and cause of error. Types of errors were classiﬁed as drug related, ﬂuid related,
indwelling device related, management decision related and failure to review in-
vestigations. Modern taxonomies of error were used to understand the cause of each
error. Errors of omission involved the failure to perform an indicated intervention
whereas errors of commission involved the inappropriate application of an inter-
vention. Errors of planning involved the incorrect management plan and errors of
execution describe an appropriate management plan, which goes awry.
3. Results
During the period October 2012eJanuary 2013 a total of 101
patients were cared for by the APST at Edendale Hospital. The
average age was forty years. There were 36 females and 65 males.
There were 66 general surgical patients and 35 trauma patients.
Fifty-six patients were referred on the same day as their admission.
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patients were hemo-dynamically unstable on presentation and
twelve were clinically septic. The reasons for referral were sepsis,4
respiratory distress,3 acute kidney injury AKI (38), post-operative
care (31), pancreatitis,3 ICU down-referral (15), hypoxia,5 low
GCS,1 coagulopathy.1 The mortality rate was 13%.
A total of thirty-six (35%) patients experienced 56 errors (1,5
errors per patient) The types of errors were ﬂuid related in (30),
drug related in,11 indwelling device related errors in,6 decision
related errors5 and failure to review investigations in.5
 The ﬂuid related errors included the inappropriate discontin-
uation of intravenous infusions in three, the failure to institute
ﬂuids in twenty-four and the choice of an inappropriate ﬂuid in
three patients.
 The drug related errors included the administration of neph-
rotoxic agents to patients with AKI in four patients and the
omission of thrombo-prophylactic agents or antibiotics in
another four patients and incorrect dosing in three patients.
 The indwelling device errors involved the incorrect placement
of indwelling devices, namely two central venous lines and one
nasogastric tube, the inappropriate removal of a urinary cath-
eter in two patients and the failure to remove a CVP in one
patient.
 The decision errors involved the timing of endoscopic inter-
vention in management of obstructive jaundice related sepsis
in one patient, the operative management of gastro-intestinal
bleeding in one, the need for laparotomy in two and the miss
assessment of the severity of acute pancreatitis in one.
 Failure to review special investigations timeously was a cause
of assessment error in ﬁve. In one patient with neutropenic
sepsis the surgical team did not follow up on the microbiology
results and failure to review routine blood results resulted in
patients with AKI being overlooked for twenty-four hours.
Failure to review a chest X-ray delayed the diagnosis of a
misplaced CVP line and a pneumothorax misplaced feeding
tube for twenty-four hours.
Table 2 tabulates the types of errors and classiﬁes them ac-
cording to cause. Errors of planning exceeded errors of execution
and errors of omission, exceeded errors of commission. A total of
143 interventions were initiated by the APST. These included
intravenous ﬂuids (101), blood transfusion,12 initiation or change of
antibiotics,9 management of neutropenic sepsis,1 central line
insertion,3 optimization of oxygen therapy,7 correction of electro-
lyte abnormality,8 correction of coagulopathy.2
4. Discussion
The introduction of an APST was in direct response to our
realization that our processes of care were inadequate and ourTable 2
Type of error compared to cause of error.
Type of error Number Planning Execution Omission Commission
Drug related 11 8 3 4 7
Fluid related 30 24 6 27 3
aDevice related 6 3 3 3 6
Decision related 5 4 1 4 1
aFailure to review
investigations
5 0 5 5 0
Total 56 39 18 43 17
a There is overlap in these two groups as failure to review X-rays resulted in
complications of indwelling device placement being overlooked. It can be argued
that these should have been excluded clinically as well as radiologically.belief that the post-operative and ward domain is a highly error
prone environment. The results of this audit have conﬁrmed that
belief. The APSTmade a high number of interventions in this cohort
of patients and detected errors and potential errors in over one
third of patients. Furthermore the high mortality rate (13%) in this
cohort suggests that human error is not particularly well tolerated
in this group of patients. The causes of the error in this audit are in
keeping with those reported in the literature where acts of omis-
sion are far more common than acts of commission.5e8
The majority of the errors and subsequent interventions
involved adjusting pre-existing or instituting appropriate ﬂuid
management. The failure to initiate ﬂuid management when indi-
cated implies that the pathophysiology of surgical disease is poorly
understood. The ﬂuid shifts associated with the management of
surgical sepsis and pancreatitis are not appreciated and are asso-
ciated with poor decision-making. The surgical patients in this
cohort were overwhelmingly septic and this is associated with
signiﬁcant ﬂuid shifts. The management of post-operative ﬂuid
shifts requires clinical acumen and insight.
Drug related errors, involved either the failure to prescribe drugs
when indicated, most commonly the omission of antibiotics for
septic patients and the omission of thrombo-prophylaxis in high-risk
patients, or the inappropriate administration of drugs, such as
potentially nephrotoxic drugs in patients with renal dysfunction.
Failure to review results may compound these errors as it may delay
the diagnosis of AKI. Two strategies are required here. The ﬁrst must
prompt the question as to whether a new agent must be instituted
and the second tomust prompt a review of all current agents to see if
any can be safely discontinued or are contra-indicated.
Inadequate decision-making is another common source of error.
The failure to appreciate the physiological insult of a number of
common acute surgical conditions is a frequent cause of error as is
the failure to be conscious of the need to actively exclude well-
known surgical complications. Delaying the endoscopic drainage
of a patient with obstructive jaundice places that patient at
increased risk for renal failure and sepsis. Logistical constraints may
make it difﬁcult to achieve but poor understanding of the clinical
risk exacerbate these delays.
The insertion of indwelling devices is associated with a number
of well-described complications. These include incorrect placement
and iatrogenic pneumothorax following the insertion of a central
venous line and incorrect placement with subsequent aspiration
risks with naso-enteral feeding tubes. If these potential complica-
tions are not in the fore-front of the attending staffs minds then
failure to chase up and review the post insertion X-ray’s may result
in these complications being undetected. It is important to stress
that some of these complications may be detected by diligent
clinical examination.
The above data may be helpful in designing further error
reducing strategies. The use of tick boxes as a pre-operative safety
strategy is well described and this has been adopted from the
aviation industry.13 Tick box style sheets my be useful in the ward
situation as well and may even be designed to force clinical de-
cisions and prompt appropriate intervention. A tick box for post
operative management could be divided into headings based on
the errors identiﬁed in this study, namely: Fluids, Drugs, Devices,
Decisions and Special investigations. Common procedures such as
central line insertion and closed tube thoracostomy are ideally
suited to the development of formalized tick boxes. Designing a
strategy to improve decision-making requires the defence in depth
type approach and the APST system used in this audit is an example
of this.3,8 Patients are assessed, by multiple teams during their
admission and this increases the chances of poor decisions being
detected and corrected. Appropriate levels of seniority are vital for
this to be effective.2
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High-risk acute surgical patients who are not admitted to
ICU/HDU for whatever reason need to be appropriately catered for.
This requires a level of care higher than what is available in a
general ward. We have attempted to combine modern error theory
with a simple risk stratiﬁcation system to improve trauma and
acute care surgery in our institution. This audit conﬁrms that these
patients are particularly vulnerable to human error and are not in a
good position to tolerate error when it does occur. The high rate of
interventions and error detection in this audit indicate that that our
intervention has achieved its objective and should be continued
and strengthened.
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